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In The System of the Constitution, Vermeule’s underlying aim appears to be to outline a new 
way of analysing constitutional systems at the aggregated levels of individual-institutional, 
and institutional-system relationships.  The constitutional system is thus said to consist of two 
levels of aggregation (individual-institutional, institutional-system) (p.27).  The members of 
the system can consist of people and institutions (p.23) but also ‘propositions of fact, morality 
or law’ (p.24).  The analysis is developed through a form of systems theory that will be 
unfamiliar to many European systems theorists; who may more commonly associate systems 
theory thinking with autopoiesis.  This approach is applied to the narrower goal of the book 
in order to show the limitations of traditional ways of examining the constitutional 
arrangements of the United States of America, allowing Vermeule to offer his version of 
systems analysis as a method not inhibited by such limitations.  
It should be said from the outset that systems theory is a somewhat ambiguous term both in 
general and in particular within Vermeule’s book.  It can refer to a variety of approaches 
including autopoiesis, complexity theory, and general systems theory.  Vermeule appears to 
adopt a systems theory approach based on one reading of complexity theory, although this is 
not explicitly stated.  One can infer that this is a complexity approach based on his references 
to ‘emergent properties’ (p.3), the importance of ‘interaction’ between individuals, 
institutions, and the constitutional system as a whole (p.8), how the whole system is ‘not 
reducible’ to the sum of its parts (p.8), and the assertion that ‘selection effects’ and ‘systemic 
feedback’ are important to a complete understanding of a constitutional system (p.116).  
However, as will be discussed in more depth later, it is not explicitly stated that this is the 
approach being applied. 
The book comprises five chapters the first of which outlines the systems theory being 
promoted, and the following three chapters see the different elements introduced in the first 
chapter expounded.  The final chapter then applies much of this reasoning to the example of 
constitutional adjudication.  Throughout there is a helpful intermixing of theory alongside 
contextual examples to explain its practical utility.  For those outside of the United States 
some of the contextual examples will seem, superficially at least, largely irrelevant; 
particularly the discussion of how the theory applies to US-specific theories of constitutional 
adjudication (Chapter 5).  However, in general, the underlying theoretical thrust of the book 
has transferable lessons both for UK and European constitutional theory, which will be 
outlined later, as do many of the examples. 
Chapter one is concerned with defining the meaning of system effects and the composition of 
systems.  The first is that of ‘fallacies of division and composition’ (p.15), which questions 
assumptions about aggregation and reductionism in constitutional systems.  Vermeule 
explains that the relationships between and behaviours of members and their host institutions, 
and institutions and their host constitutional system are often assumed to align so that ‘what 
is true of the aggregate must also be true of the members’ (p.15).  Vermeule’s systems 
analysis suggests a counterintuitive conclusion could be more appropriate, so that it is often 
correct to say that ‘what is true of the members of an aggregate is not true of the aggregate’ 
or vice versa (p.15).  The second effect, connected with the first, is that of the invisible hand 
(following Adam Smith).  Where ‘some kind of order … arises at the group level even if 
none of the individuals who comprise the group is attempting to create that order’, this will 
be taken as an invisible hand effect (p.16).  A supporting caution, which relies on two 
preceding effects, related to the two central system effects is that of so-called second-best 
solutions.  According to Vermeule it will not always be best to compromise so as to satisfy 
only some of the conditions viewed as necessary for optimum performance in the aggregate 
institution or constitutional system (p.29), as this may result in unexpected negative outcomes 
(p.30).  Importantly, Vermeule does not treat his systems perspective as the only tool 
necessary for understanding constitutional systems, but does say that ‘system effects are 
analytically inescapable’ (p.36). 
Chapter two sees the initial application of the systems approach outlined in chapter one.  The 
chapter offers some counter-intuitive conclusions on commonplace procedural and structural 
elements of constitutional orders using compositional and divisional fallacy arguments.  For 
example, on the procedural side, while an individual election permits voter control of elected 
officials, many elections may, paradoxically, dilute their ability to control power decisively 
(p.46).  It is a fallacy of composition to assume that more elections to more offices equates 
with enhanced voter control.  Structurally, Vermeule convincingly explains how two 
unrepresentative, undemocratic law-making institutions can still produce democratic 
outcomes as a consequence of the system effects which emerge out of their interactions 
(p.50).  It is a fallacy of composition to assume that democratic deficits in specific institutions 
lead to democratic deficits in the aggregated system overall.  Under invisible hand arguments, 
it is possible to ‘generate a kind of emergent democracy at the system level, even if the 
components are not themselves democratic in isolation’ (p.51, original emphasis).   
This argument, both from a procedural and structural perspective, has clearly transferable 
lessons for the UK and European constitutional debates.  For example, analysis of potential 
reform to the House of Lords leading to an at least partially elected chamber could produce 
some counter-intuitive outcomes.  On the procedural side, Vermeule’s argument suggests that 
democratising the upper chamber will not necessarily result in voters being able to exercise 
more effective control over politicians’ law-making powers.  Similarly, although the House 
of Lords in isolation offends numerous democratic principles, Vermeule’s theory would 
allow one to make the convincing argument that collectively the constitutional system of the 
United Kingdom may generate ‘a kind of emergent democracy at the system level’ (p.51), 
partly as a consequence of its undemocratic components.  Turning to Europe, the structural 
arguments again have the potential to offer a new perspective on the democratic deficit which 
Europe is often accused of suffering from.  Although the various elements which comprise 
the European Union are in differing ways undemocratic, it does not automatically follow that 
the system as a whole must possess the same characteristics.  Certainly some further 
investigation as to whether the emergent democracy argument can be applied to Europe is 
necessary before the precise nature of any deficit is declared.  Vermeule notes that the ‘causal 
intuition of legal theorists’ about structural and procedural relationships ‘are suspect’ , 
because they fail to consider the emergent interactive effects revealed by a systems analysis, 
and do not consider the compositional and divisional fallacies implicit in their arguments 
(p.64).  This is not the same as saying that emergent democracy always exists, merely that 
there are system effects to address before reaching any conclusions. 
In chapter three Vermeule returns to consider invisible hand arguments and their potential 
limitations, having primarily addressed compositional and divisional fallacies in chapter two.  
Invisible hand arguments support the notion of emergentism; that interacting components can 
produce system-level effects not necessarily derivable from its parts.  He addresses three 
challenges to invisible hand mechanisms working effectively in the constitutional system; 
norms, second-best efforts, and verification problems.  Norms ‘cannot be perfectly fine-
tuned’ (p.85), however they are always present, interacting with constitutional structures and 
actors not necessarily for the (normatively defined) good.  Their imperfections or partial 
adoption can impair invisible hand effects (pp.85-6).  Moving to arguments against second-
best solutions he states that, although they are potentially problematic, ‘partial compliance 
with norms might make things worse, not better’  in terms of emergent system level outcomes 
(p.87).  However, it is also possible that interaction among sub-optimal elements might come 
‘as close as possible to the ideal’ (p.87).  Vermeule acknowledges that it is hard to verify 
invisible hand arguments (pp.95-6), but remarks that assuming that self-interest individuals 
must reside in anti-public-spirited systems is a ‘straightforward fallacy of composition’ 
(p.97).  The whole cannot be understood by the sum of its parts, this is a fallacy of division 
(p.98).  The thrust of the chapter is that, while invisible hand arguments are integral to a 
systems understanding of the constitutional order, there are problems which cannot be 
overlooked (pp.99-100). 
Although Vermeule acknowledges certain limitations to invisible hand arguments he 
otherwise adopts the existing understandingrelatively uncritically stating that they are ‘a 
striking and important subclass of systemic analysis’ (p.99).  Much of the early complexity 
theory literature makes positive references to the emergent elements of Smith’s invisible hand 
argument for economics, but they also caution against its linear understanding of causality, 
and somewhat reductionist undertones.  Vermeule asserts that ‘invisible hand justifications 
face a set of recurring dilemmas’, which does infer an acknowledgement of the limitations of 
Smith’s original proposition (pp.99-100).  However, these constraints are said to ‘arise from 
the systemic character of their structure’ (p. 100).  This is not equivalent to stating that the 
understanding adopted is flawed, only that aspects of its internal composition are self-
limiting, which is a weaker critique.  Although Vermeule offers some comment on the Smith-
inspired invisible hand arguments made by James Madison in The Federalist No.51, and 
recognises a number of limitations to these, he again makes little explicit critique of Smith’s 
theory in this regard.   
In addition to the above critique of the use of Smith’s theory, there is a further more specific 
example which is problematic in a complexity theory context.  Vermeule adopts the idea of 
‘equilibrium arrangements’ (p.3).  This idea is a consequence of invisible hand effects.  A 
stylised reading of Smith’s argument is that individual agent interactions will, whether they 
desire it or not, promote a stable economy for the public good.  However, much of the 
subsequent work on complexity theory indicated that stability might be more appropriately 
equated with entropy (system death).  On the basis of this thinking, rather than being classed 
as stable, complex systems are to be understood as dynamic, always poised to adapt.  While a 
system might appear stable over the short term, in actuality they were continually re-
organising to remain relevant in a changing environment.  Thus, over the long term, the initial 
perception of equilibrium becomes inaccurate.  It may simply be that equilibrium was a poor 
choice of word , because much of Vermeule’s argument in chapter four, on self-stabilising 
and self-undermining rules, appear to contradict the initial claim that constitutional systems 
are ‘equilibrium arrangements’ (p.3, see also p.171). 
Chapter four discusses the system effects of feedback and selection.  The proposition is that 
constitutional rules can have numerous effects on themselves and other related rules.  For 
example, some rules help to construct the pool of potential candidate office-holders who will 
be responsible for administering the rules (p.101).  This can lead to either ‘self-stabilising’ 
rules, if the office-holders are selected so as to support the system, or as ‘self-undermining’ 
(p.123).  Neither effect is always good or bad for the system.  Sometimes a stabilising rule 
will act to protect voting rights (p.118), at other times a rule designed to protect judicial 
independence (the example given is Article III(1) of the US Constitution the ‘compensation 
clause’), a stabilising rule, may inadvertently discourage lawyers from joining the bench by 
suppressing salary increases (pp.123-5).  Short term policies may benefit from destabilising 
elements which prevent their running into the long term (p.123), whereas rules protecting free 
speech may be undermined if they allow extremist views to become established (pp.127-31).  
Selection effects and feedback are best suited to a long-term analysis (p.131), but will tend to 
support the fallacy of composition/division arguments made, and invisible hand explanations 
of emergent system phenomena.  Taken in conjunction with the emergent invisible hand 
effects, and fallacies of composition and division already noted, the discussion of selection 
and feedback shows that the interaction among elements of constitutional structures creates 
unforeseen outcomes which tend not to be visible in the short term.  The notions of selection 
and feedback suggest that constitutional theorists may benefit from considering the 
ramifications of their theories over longer timescales than they are otherwise accustomed to 
(pp. 101, 116-7, 131).   
In the final chapter Vermeule combines his individual outlines of each element of his theory 
by applying it to constitutional adjudication, which he justifies as appropriate on the basis 
that this is ‘the traditional subject of constitutional theory’ (p.135).  The essence of the 
argument is that there are a variety of schools of interpretation which have been identified 
and which are followed in United States’ constitutional adjudication.  However, Vermeule 
asserts that the systemically minded judge will be able to see beyond any of their own 
interpretive preferences and will become a ‘legal chameleon’, adapting to suit the context of 
the judiciary around her (p.135).  Outlining a method of ‘principled consequentialism’ 
(pp.136-7), he brings his fallacy of composition/division and invisible hand arguments to bear 
to suggest that there can be no single right method of interpretation because ‘what would be 
best for all’ is not necessarily ‘best for each’ (p.137).  Having reviewed a number of methods 
of judicial interpretation he argues that it is hard to define what is the “best” method of 
interpretation because what is viewed as the most appropriate method will ‘depend on the 
judicial and institutional environment in which [the judges] find themselves’ (p.169).  Thus 
the principled consequentialist stance of the legal chameleon is justified.  Rebuking Dworkin, 
he remarks that ‘even a superhuman Hercules must operate in an environment where the 
behaviour of other judges… [and] institutions, may affect what would otherwise be his best 
course of action’ (p.169).  The judicial chameleon will recognise the limits of her own 
knowledge and preferred interpretivist stance in the environment (p.170).  Thus, it becomes 
possible for the judicial system to support the proposition that it makes sense to ‘hedge the 
risk that any particular theory is erroneous’, and so not approve any single method as the best, 
or most correct one (p.170).  This position echoes much of the recent research published by 
philosophers studying complexity theory as regards the limitations and locality of knowledge. 
There is one further, potentially controversial, claim made within the book which has not yet 
been discussed.  That is, that while systems theory has been used by political scientists ‘legal 
applications are few and far between’ (p.8).  Following the accompanying note to this 
statement one reads that Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory ‘does not have much to do 
with systems theory as understood in the social sciences’ and goes on to say that the theory is 
‘notoriously obscure’ and ‘difficult to cash out in … [a] pragmatically relevant fashion’ (n.3 
p.181).  There is some truth in this statement if one takes the view that autopoietic theory and 
complexity theory are relatively unrelated, and finds autopoietic theory needlessly opaque.  
As to the first claim, it has previously been elsewhere suggested that autopoiesis and 
complexity theory are closely related, some have even proposed that one could be subsumed 
under the other theory or vice versa.  The second claim is primarily a question of perspective.  
While it may not be the case in the United States, in Europe, because of the vast array of 
publications considering the utility of autopoietic analysis, it is possible to deploy autopoiesis 
whether or not one agrees with the theoretical premises.  However, it is a weakness of the 
book as a whole, viewed from a European perspective, that it does not deal with what is a 
very well established systems theory in law (and the social sciences), both in Europe and to a 
lesser extent in North America.  This criticism is particularly apt because the precise origins 
of Vermeule’s theory are not made clear, making it difficult to situate it in the wider systems 
theory discourse.  Furthermore the theoretical structure, although sketched in the 
introduction, is mostly left implicit throughout the text.  A fuller account of what aspects of 
complexity theory were being adopted would greatly aid a reader unfamiliar with systems 
theory accounts in general.  This is particularly so given that the book represents an analysis 
of the US constitutional system, and thus it is likely to be attractive to constitutional theorists 
who will not likely be familiar with systems theory. 
Having made these criticisms it should be made clear that the broad thrust of the book is to be 
supported.  It cogently applies a theory not commonly used in public law, or legal discourse 
generally, with fascinating consequences.  It is a book which constitutional theorists, and 
indeed legal scholars in general, would benefit from reading.  By adopting a systemic view of 
constitutional structures and processes Vermeule has shown that it is possible to ‘redefine the 
questions’ (p.173) we should ask in the debate on constitutionalism.  While the outcome of a 
systems-analytical approach does not necessarily ‘entail particular answers’, its ability to 
reconceptualise the debate is to be welcomed (p.173).  Ultimately ‘the official’, and by 
relation also the theorist, ‘who thinks systemically will approach matters very differently’ 
plausibly yielding a different perspective on constitutional questions (p.173).  Although this 
new understanding should not be taken in isolation, it raises important questions about the 
answers we currently provide to constitutional issues and debates, such as that on 
constitutionalism. 
The book as a whole offers new directions for the discussion of constitutional structures and 
procedures at the national level and in a European context which should not be dismissed out 
of hand.  It represents a radical shift in perspective suggesting an alternative way of 
considering constitutional questions.  Vermeule is modest about the potential impact of the 
theory.  Although he views his method of systems theory as ‘an indispensable analytical tool’ 
(p.177), it does not hold all the answers, and does not declare systems analysis conclusive 
(p.133).  From this we can infer two things.  First, that Vermeule is open to the possibility of 
alternative conceptions of complex systems analysis, and secondly that this does not mark the 
end of established methods of constitutional analysis. 
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